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Abstract 
 
Wie in vielen anderen Ländern auch, beruhen die deutschen Beamtenpensionen 
traditionell auf einem umlage- und steuerfinanzierten System der Leistungszusage (defined 
benefit pension – DB). Aufgrund fehlender Rücklagen resultieren aus den 
Pensionsverspechen ungedeckte Verbindlichkeiten in Milliardenhöhe, die als solche jedoch 
nicht offiziell als Staatsverschuldung ausgewiesen werden. Das damit einhergehende Problem 
steigender Belastungen zukünftiger Haushalte wurde von der Politik erkannt, und erste 
Schritte in Richtung Kapitaldeckung wurden mit der Einführung der Versorgungsrücklagen 
sowie der Finanzierungsfonds vollzogen. Vor diesem Hintergrund evaluiert diese Studie die 
Chancen und Risiken, die mit dem Übergang zu einem (partiell) kapitalgedeckten 
Beamtenpensionssystems verbunden sind. Als Datengrundlage dient hierzu die vollständige 
Personalstandsstatistik des Landes Hessen, dessen Beamtenpopulation repräsentativ für den 
größten Teil des deutschen Beamtensystems ist. 
Unter Verwendung eigens für diese Studie berechneter Beamtensterbetafeln werden 
zunächst die Pensionsansprüche der aktuellen Pensionäre sowie die bereits erdienten 
Anwartschaften der aktuell diensttuenden Beamten aktuariell bewertet. Auf Grundlage einer 
50-Jahres-Prognose der Beamtenpopulationsentwicklung werden die zur Finanzierung der 
Pensionsversprechen benötigten Beiträge, d.h. der Beitragssatz in Bezug auf die 
Beamtengehälter, deterministisch bestimmt. Im Rahmen einer Monte Carlo-Studie und auf 
Basis eines stochastischen Barwert-Ansatzes wird sodann die Anlagestrategie für das 
Planvermögen bestimmt, die zu minimalem Crash-Risiko, gemessen als Conditional Value at 
Risk der gesamten Pensionskosten, führt. Abschließend wird aufgezeigt, welchen Freiraum 
der Pensionsplanmanager hinsichtlich der Wahl von Beitragssatz und Anlagestrategie hat, 
wenn er nur auf Einhaltung eines vorgegebenen Risikobudgets verpflichtet wurde. 
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1. Introduction  
Public employee pension systems throughout the developed world have 
traditionally been of the pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) variety, where 
pensioner payments are financed by taxes (contributions) levied on the working 
generation. But as the number of retirees rises relative to the working-age group, such 
systems have begun to face financial distress. This trend has been exacerbated in many 
countries, among them Germany, by high unemployment rates producing further 
deterioration of the contribution base. In the long run, public sector pension benefits 
will have to be cut or contributions increased, if the systems are to be maintained.  
An alternative path sometimes offered to ease the crunch of paying for public 
employee pensions is to move toward funding: here, plan assets are gradually built up, 
invested, and enhanced returns devoted to partly defray civil servants’ pension costs. In 
this study, we evaluate the impact of introducing partial prefunding, paired with a 
strategic investment policy for the German federal state of Hesse. The analysis assesses 
the impact of introducing a supplementary tax-sponsored pension fund whose 
contributions are invested in the capital market and used to relieve the state budget from 
(some) pension payments. Our model determines the expectation and the Conditional 
Value-at-Risk of economic pension costs using a stochastic simulation process for 
pension plan assets. This approach simultaneously determines the optimal contribution 
rate and asset allocation that controls the expected economic costs of providing the 
promised pensions, while at the same time controlling investment risk. Specifically, we 
offer answers to the following questions:  
1.  How can the plan be designed to control cash-flow shortfall risk, so as to 
mitigate the potential burden borne by future generations of taxpayers? 
2.  What is the optimal asset allocation for this fund as it is built up, to generate a 
maximum return while simultaneously restricting capital market and liability 
risk? 
3.  What are reasonable combinations of annual contribution rates and asset 
allocation to a state-managed pension fund, which will limit costs of providing 
promised public sector pensions? 
We anticipate that this research will interest several sorts of policymaker groups. 
First, focusing on the German case, the state and Federal governments should find it 
relevant, as these entities face considerable public sector pension liabilities. Second, our 
findings will also be of interest to other European countries, as most have substantial 
underfunded defined benefit plans for civil servants.  - 2 - 
 
In what follows, we first offer a brief description of the structure of civil servant 
pensions in Germany, focusing on their benefit formulas, their financing, and the 
resulting current as well as future plan obligations for taxpayers. Next, we turn to an 
analysis of the actuarial status of the Hesse civil servants’ pension plan and evaluate 
how much would have to be contributed to fund this plan in a nonstochastic context. 
Subsequently we evaluate the asset-liability and decision-making process from the 
viewpoint of the plan sponsor, to determine sensible plan asset allocation behavior. A 
final section summarizes findings and implications. 
2. Civil Servant Pensions in Germany 
Whereas civil servant pensions are relatively well-funded in the United States 
(Hustead and Mitchell, 2001), the same is not the case in Germany. There, most civil 
servants have been promised an unfunded, non-contributory, tax-sponsored DB pension 
with benefits which are a function of salary and service. Over time, politicians and 
employees have gradually become aware of the cost of public pensions, particularly as 
the population has aged, and a few small reforms have been implemented to date. In 
1996, for instance, the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate launched a financing fund 
for newly hired civil servants to cope with the increasing burden of future pension 
payments. The state currently pays 20-30 percent of covered payroll for active civil 
servants into that fund. No doubt due to politicians’ risk aversion, the fund’s investment 
portfolio has thus far been restricted to government bonds, thereby neglecting the 
opportunity to improve returns by investing in equity markets. Accordingly, while first 
steps toward funding German civil servants pensions have been taken, no public 
pension plan is fully funded and investment patterns in the few cases where the plans 
have assets are extraordinarily conservative. 
2.1 Public Sector Pension Parameters  
It is widely recognized that a pension plan represents a long-term contract 
between an employer and the plan participants. That is, workers give up current salary 
in exchange for future retirement benefits, either directly through salary deferral, or 
indirectly through foregone earnings (Husted and Mitchell, 2001). From the perspective 
of an employer, the structure of a retirement plan and its overall generosity can be an 
important means of attracting, recruiting, and retaining valued employees. Particularly 
when an employer must invest in specific training for the employee to do his job, it is in 
his interest to restrict worker mobility once trained so as to maximize returns on this 
investment (McGill et al., 2006). In this sense, traditional DB pensions have been 
recognized as suitable for workers in lifetime jobs (and less appropriate for mobile 
workers).  - 3 - 
 
Originating in the Middle Ages, the German civil service system with its rights 
and duties was initially codified in the Allgemeines Preussisches Landrecht of 1794, an 
early Prussian constitution, and with some adaptations, the system is still in force today 
(Gillis, 1968). As in many other countries, a German civil servant traditionally commits 
his lifetime to public sector tasks. This civil servant then is promised a retirement 
annuity that depends on his age at retirement, his years of service in the public sector, 
and his final salary. In exchange for a noncontributory plan, civil servants “pay” 
indirectly by having significantly lower gross earnings than other public sector worker 
with comparable credentials.
1 Civil servants are also not included in the national social 
security system
2 nor covered by supplementary occupational pensions; rather, each state 
has a DB pension plan specific to that state.
3 As public employees are not covered by 
social security, they receive higher retirement benefits than their private sector 
counterparts who tend to receive both social security and occupational pension benefits 
(Heubeck and Rürup 2000). 
In recent years, however, German public pension plan generosity has begun to 
be curtailed substantially. Until 1991, for instance, the DB pension formula provided 
accruals according to a nonlinear function. Thus, for service to 10 years, the 
replacement rate was 35 percent of final salary; for an additional 15 years of service, 
benefits rose by 2 percent per year. After 25 years of service, benefit accruals increased 
at only 1 percent annually, resulting in a maximum replacement rate of 75 percent of 
final salary after 35 years of service. Then in 1992, the benefit formula was transformed 
into a strictly linear function: benefit accrual was set at 1.875 percent of final salary per 
year of service, so that the traditional 75 percent replacement rate would be paid only 
after 40 years of service (rather than after 35 years as previously). In 2003, new 
legislation again brought benefit cuts for civil servant pensions. Over time, annual 
pension accruals will be gradually reduced to 1.79375 percent of final salary, providing 
retiring civil servants with a maximum replacement rate of 71.75 percent after 40 years 
of service. Current pensioners will also be affected in that their usual post-retirement 
benefit increases will be slightly reduced. After 8 rounds of pension increases, their 
nominal replacement rate will have declined to (a maximum of) 71.75 percent (though 
the nominal pension benefit will have increased to some extent). 
The standard retirement age for civil servants is currently 65, though early 
retirement is possible at age 63; for early retirement, a discount factor of 0.3 percentage 
                                                 
1 For example, a single research assistant age 30 with no children employed under private law at a 
university earns an annual gross salary of about € 41,000. If that person is promoted to the rank of 
assistant professor, he will then be employed under civil servant rules, and his gross salary would shrink 
to about € 39,000. 
2 Civil servants are also exempt from unemployment insurance and the state pays a certain fraction of 
health expenses of civil servants and their families (ranging from 50% - 85%, depending on family status 
and number of children); see Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2003). 
3 While each state has its own pension plan, the benefit structure for civil servant pensions is nearly equal 
across the different states in Germany.   - 4 - 
 
points per month of early retirement is applied. Because police work and fire fighting 
are physically demanding occupations, retirement benefits for public safety workers 
typically allow retirement at earlier ages, in part to maintain a younger workforce.
4 If an 
active or retired civil servant dies, the spouse is entitled to a survivorship benefit of 55 
percent (formerly 60 percent) of the deceased civil servant’s pension (in addition, 
orphans receive 20 percent and half-orphans 12 percent). 
From the employee’s perspective, the relatively more generous civil servant 
pension is partial compensation for their inflexibility and non-portability. For instance, 
if a civil servant were to leave his job for the private sector, he would forego a 
substantial part of his accrued pension benefits, losing over half of his pension 
accruals.
5 It is clear that this creates a strong disincentive for older civil servants to 
leave their public sector jobs. 
2.2 Key Aspects of Hesse’s Civil Servant Pension System 
To illustrate the opportunities and risks of reform, we turn to an assessment of 
the civil servant pension offered to public workers employed by the German federal 
state of Hesse, one of 16 states that form the Federal Republic of Germany. Located in 
the southwestern center of Germany, Hesse’s population of 6.1 million represents 
almost 8 percent of Germany’s 83 million residents. Hesse’s economic heart is the 
Rhine-Main area located around the 650.000 inhabitant city of Frankfurt, which is the 
center of the German financial and banking industry, domicile of Europe’s second most 
important stock exchange and one of the world’s largest airports. With a GDP of €204 
billion, Hesse contributes about 9 percent to the German GDP.
6 As Hesse was part of 
the former West Germany, its population of civil servants may be seen as rather 
representative of the approximately 1.5 million active (about 4.5% of German 
workforce) and 900,000 retired civil servants in Germany as a whole.
7  
The dataset on which our study is based was provided by the Hessian Statistical 
Office. It contains anonymized demographic and economic data on virtually all active 
and retired civil servants in Hesse as of the beginning of 2004, including their age, sex, 
                                                 
4 Another pathway to retirement for civil servants is disability, which we do not focus on in the present 
study. Disability payments are based on final salary and the replacement rate accrued until being disabled, 
reduced by 0.3 percentage points per month before 63 (not to exceed 10.8 percent). If disabled while on 
duty, payments are based on the salary projected to regular retirement. Subject to the regular maximum 
replacement rate, the civil servant is additionally credited 1/3 of the regular accrual he would have 
received up to the age of 60; the replacement rate is then increased by 20 percent. Altogether, the 
disability pension comes to at least 2/3 but cannot exceed 71.75 percent of the relevant salary. 
5 In this instance, the state will pay to the social security program an amount equal to the foregone 
employer contributions to social security for that employee. 
6 All data provided by the German Federal Statistical Office and the Hessian Statistical Office (2006). 
7 These numbers include only federal and state civil servants, but not the about 200,000 active and 
500,000 retired civil servants worked for former state owned (but now privatized) enterprise, e.g. the 
German national railway and federal mail (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2005). - 5 - 
 
marital status, line of service (for active civil servants), and salary/pension payments.
8 
In addition, to derive civil servant-specific mortality tables, we have sampled data on 
the number of living retirees at the beginning of each year as well as the number of 
those deceased each year for the period 1994-2004, by age and sex. Descriptive 
statistics on our sample appear in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Civil Servant and Retiree Pension Obligations 
  
Number Female 
Avg.Salary/ 
Pension  Avg. Age 
Active Civil Servants   104,919  44.5%  €  39,000  44.7 
By Service Level          
Higher   28,946  37.0%  €  46,000  47.7 
Upper   63,843  49.3%  €  38,000  45.6 
Middle   11,609  38.4%  €  31,000  40.3 
Lower   503  12.5%  €  26,000  43.7 
         
Pensioners   60,418  47.2%  €  29,000  71.8 
By Origin of Claim          
Retired Civil Servants    43,065  28.0%  € 33,000  69.6 
Surviving Dependents    17,353  95.0%  € 18,000  77.3 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse for 2004. 
The overall number of active civil servants in our sample for 2004 is 104,919, of 
which 45 percent are female. Salary payments to this workgroup amounted to an annual 
€4.26 billion or 33 percent of Hesse’s annual state tax revenues. The higher service 
level includes mostly university professors and high school teachers, of which 37 
percent are female and the average age is 47.7 years; annual salary levels average 
€ 46,000. Some 61 percent of the sample is in the upper service level, which includes 
police inspectors and elementary and junior high school teachers. As many teachers are 
female, women make up 49.3 percent of employees in this group. With an average age 
of 45.6 years, these civil servants receive an average salary of € 38,000. The middle 
service level employs 11,609 workers, i.e. in lower police service, 38.4 percent of which 
are female. On average, these civil servants are 40.3 years old and earn € 31,000 per 
year. The lower service level is on average 43.7 years old and earns an average annual 
income of € 26.000.  
Turning to retirees, pension payments for those in our sample amount to an 
overall € 1.76 billion or 14 percent of Hesse’s annual tax revenues. In total, the number 
of pensioners is 60,418, of which 71 percent represent retired civil servants; the 
remaining 17,353 pensioners are surviving dependents. Most of the retired civil servants 
(72 percent) are male, but 95 percent of the dependents are female. Male retired civil 
servants are on average 70 years old and receive an average annual pension of € 34,500, 
whereas female retired civil servants average 68.6 years of age with an average annual 
pension of € 30,500. Among surviving dependents, females are on average 77.7 years 
old and earn an annual average pension income of €  18,500, while their male 
                                                 
8 For the reason of anonymity, information on top-level civil servants as well as judges and state attorneys 
were omitted. Smaller cohorts, e.g. those within the lower service level, were grouped to larger units. - 6 - 
 
counterparts are only 68.8 years on average and receive mean dependents benefits of 
€ 15,500 per year. 
3. Valuing the Public Pension in a Non-Stochastic Framework  
Next we turn to an analysis of the actuarial status of the Hesse civil servants’ 
pension plan. In this section, we evaluate how much would have to be contributed to 
fund this plan in a nonstochastic context, which of course requires an actuarial 
evaluation of the plan’s liabilities. In this section, accordingly, we combine information 
about the benefit formulas and anticipated retirement ages with demographic and 
economic assumptions. Specifically, we project how and when participants will leave 
active association with the plan and how long benefits will be paid after retirement. 
These assumptions must include anticipated mortality and disability rates, probabilities 
of retirement, and regular as well as survivor benefits. In what follows, we discuss these 
assumptions in detail for the civil servants covered by pensions in the state of Hesse. 
3.1 Mortality Patterns 
German civil servants generally tend to enjoy lower mortality rates than the 
general population (apart from police and other special service units). For this reason, it 
is essential to derive mortality tables specific to this group, yet the state government 
does not currently maintain these. We therefore derive the relevant mortality tables 
using standard actuarial methods and personnel statistics provided by the Hessian 
statistical office. To this end, for each year from 1994-2004, we sampled the numbers 
t x l , of active and retired civil servants by sex which were alive of age x at the beginning 
of the respective year t, and out of this cohort we compute the number  t x d , of those who 
died before reaching year t+1. By dividing the aggregate number of deaths by the 
aggregate number of lives covered, we derive the raw rate of mortality  1999 , ˆx q  of a 
person aged x around the year 1999 (Wolfsdorf 1997, pp. 50ff., DAV 2004, p. 76): 
 
 
∑
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To smooth erratic changes in mortality rates due to small samples, we employ 
the well-established method of Whittaker (1923) and Henderson (1924) to obtain 
graduated rates of mortality  1999 , x q : 
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where  i x  represents the size of the number of observations for cohort i relative to the 
over-all sample size, g balances the goodness-of-fit versus the level of smoothness, with 
g = 0 resulting in a perfect fit of raw and graduated mortality rates, and Δ represents the 
difference operator (Joseph 1952, p. 99). 
On analyzing the derived mortality rates thus derived, it turns out that for ages 
60 to 80, the results are quite close to the annuitant mortality rates published by the 
German Association of Actuaries (DAV 2004), supporting the notion that civil servants 
live longer than the average population (see Figure 1).
9  
We make use of this result when estimating mortality rates for those above the 
age of 80. Here, the usual approach would be to specify a law of mortality (e.g. 
Gompertz-Makeham), calibrate it based on empirical observations, and then extrapolate 
mortality rates for the very old (Milbrodt and Helbig 1999). Due to the limited number 
of observations in our sample, we instead use annuitant mortality rates for over age 80. 
 
Figure 1: A Comparison of Mortality Rates for Civil Servants, the  
Total Population, and Annuitants 
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Notes: Authors’ compilation of mortality rates for female 
Hessian civil servants; annuitants’ mortality rates as derived 
by the German Association of Actuaries (DAV 2004); 
population mortality rates as stated by the German Federal 
Statistical Office (mortality table 2003/2005). 
 
                                                 
9 Specifically, the mortality table we employ is the DAV 2006 R, Aggregattafel 2. Ordnung (see DAV 
2004, p. 53ff.). - 8 - 
 
To account for future mortality improvements, we incorporate an exponential 
trend function to project future mortality rates base on  those  of  1999  (DAV  2004,          
p. 38): 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1999 1999 − ⋅ − ⋅ = t x F q q x t x exp , , . (3) 
 
For the age-depending trend factor F(x) we also rely on data provided by the 
German Association of Actuaries, using their unadjusted mid-term trend function 
(Zieltrend 2. Ordnung) (see DAV 2004, p. 56ff.). Employing this trend function, the rate 
of mortality of a female civil servant aged 65 will decrease by 40 percent until the year 
2030. 
3.2 Population Dynamics 
When analyzing the transition to a funded pension system, it is necessary to 
account not only for current employees, but also to recognize that new employees will 
be hired in the future. Projecting civil service employment far into the future is, of 
course, quite complex, and a complete characterization of all possible evolutionary 
paths of the future workforce is not the primary focus of this study. We therefore take a 
simple yet sensible approach to describe the development of the future workforce, 
drawing on the current active population as a base. We forecast the evolution of age and 
salary for every existing civil servant assuming constant marital status over time. When 
a position becomes vacant, we assign to that job a new civil servant with a 50% chance 
of being male or female, abstracting from promotion from within. The new worker’s 
age is assigned as the average age of new hires, accounting for average time spent on 
position-related education or other types of public service that will be credited as 
pensionable years in civil service. The worker’s salary is assigned as the age-related 
remuneration for this position and marital status is that of the previous position holder. 
Employee turnover other than retirement can be assumed to be of minor 
significance. While there might be some fluctuation within the group of assistant 
professors that leave civil service after not receiving tenure and start a career in the 
private sector, most state employees remain in service once they become full civil 
servants.
10 We therefore do not account for employee turnover and instead assume that 
civil servants remain in service until retirement age. This latter is set at 67, anticipating 
that the latest changes to public pension regulations (i.e. the increase of regular 
retirement age from 65 to 67) is also required for civil servants. It is furthermore 
                                                 
10 This is due to the fact that the pension benefits are not particularly portable when a civil servant moves 
to the private sector. As a result, observed low turnover is in line with the general aim of a generous DB-
pension plan, i.e. to retain public sector employees in their jobs. - 9 - 
 
assumed that all civil servants reach this age with certainty and remain active until 
then.
11 
Retired civil servants are not modeled individually; rather they are represented 
by the expected cash flows that result from the indexed life annuities they receive 
according to the civil service pension benefit formula based on service years and final 
salary. For workers with a spouse, these annuities are indexed joint-and-survivor 
annuities where we assume that both partners are of same age and opposite sexes. 
Figure 2 shows the projected age distribution for old-age pensioners over the next 30 
years. 
 
Figure 2: Projected Age Distribution of Old-Age Pensioners 
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Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse. 
As can be seen, the number of retirees and their average age is projected to rise 
substantially over the next decades. In particular, we find that a significant number of 
civil servants will retire from 2017 onward. 
3.3 Economic Assumptions 
The three central economic factors that have a major impact on the valuation of 
a pension plan are inflation, salary growth, and investment returns; all these are 
interrelated and must be considered simultaneously (Hustead and Mitchell, 2001). 
Although inflation in the Euro zone is currently low, it still is important for pension 
cash flows and their valuation. Accordingly, we base all our analysis on real returns and 
financial values, which simplifies the modeling by eliminating a stochastic factor and 
                                                 
11 Provisions for early retirement and disability benefits, as well as dependents’ benefits due to death in 
service, are therefore neglected. - 10 - 
 
also sheds light on the actual economic cost of providing real civil servant pensions as 
salary increases and pension benefits tend to be tied to the consumer price index.
12 We 
therefore assume that salaries and pensions are at least increased with inflation, i.e. the 
minimum growth rate of real wages is zero. (Below we also report an alternative set of 
results using a real wage growth rates of 1 percent, to further explore how these salary 
assumptions affect results.) 
Assumptions on investment returns are crucial as they influence the rate at 
which pension liabilities should be discounted. Due to their long-term character, 
pension liabilities have a long duration and therefore are sensitive to the discount rate 
selected. According the choice of the discount rate there is an ongoing debate, which 
Blake (2006, p. 77) defines as the difference between an actuarial versus an economic 
valuation of pension liabilities. Traditionally, actuaries choose the discount rate which 
reflects a reasonable projected expected return of the asset backing the pension 
liabilities. If the pension assets are partly invested in equities, the discount rate includes 
also an equity risk premium, which is from an ex ante perspective not realized. By 
contrast, many economists argue that the relevant number for discounting future 
pension payments is the riskless rate of interest rate reflecting the financing cost of the 
plan sponsor. In what follows, we follow the latter approach and discount liabilities at 
the real rate on (quasi-) risk-free long term government bonds. Our economic rationale 
is that this rate reflects the state’s financing costs. We assume that this real risk free 
interest rate is in the base case 3 percent.
13 To check for the interest rate sensitivity of 
our analysis, we also explore results with a real interest rate of 1.5 percent. 
3.4 Implied Pension Debt for Current Civil Servants 
Our primary focus in this paper is to show how one can structure and fund public 
employee pension promises in the future.  Nevertheless, it is worth knowing how large 
already-accrued pension claims might be. Table 2 summarizes both the implied pension 
debt for retired civil servants currently receiving old age and survivor benefits, as well 
as active workers’ accrued pension liabilities (as of 2004), as well as future projected 
benefits. We offer these for two alternative discount rates and real rates of salary and 
pension increases.  
                                                 
12 Federal law stipulates that salaries as well as pensions are adjusted for changes in the general economic 
and financial circumstances, which mainly means changes in consumer prices. Cost of living adjustments 
are not explicitly guaranteed on an annual basis, but in the past salaries and pensions have kept pace with 
inflation and may even rise in real terms due to rises in real average incomes outside the public sector. 
13 The difference between the average nominal par yield of long term German government bonds and the 
average inflation rate for the post-WWII period is about 4 percent. Inflation protected bonds in the 
Eurozone currently yield about 2 percent. This market is currently not well developed for government 
bonds (especially those with long durations) which supports the assumption of a real interest rate of 3%. - 11 - 
 
 
Table 2: Implied Pension Debt for Current Pensioners and Workers 
      Current Pensioners    PBO Active Workers    Future 
Accumulations 
     Salary-/Pension 
Increase p.a.    Salary-/Pension 
Increase p.a.    Salary-/Pension 
Increase p.a. 
     0%  1%  0%  1%  0%  1% 
  Disc.  Rate   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                
     Panel 1: Total (billion €) 
(1)  1.5%   28.41  31.90  28.52  37.43  20.70  30.41 
(2)  3%   24.30  26.97  19.63  25.21  12.14  17.36 
                
     Panel 2: As % of Explicit Public Debt 
(3)  1.5%   96.5  108.3   96.9  127.1   70.3  103.3 
(4)  3%   82.6  91.6  66.7  85.6  41.2  59.0 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse for 2004. 
Panel 1 of the table reports pension liabilities in terms of billions of ’04 €, while 
Panel 2 relates the liabilities to the official level of state indebtedness. Pension debt is 
referred to as “implied” in the Table, as it is not formally reported as explicit 
government debt. The results show that explicit state debt is greatly understated by 
omission of the civil servant pension obligations. For instance, for the base case with a 
discount rate of 3 percent and zero real pension increases (Row 2, Column 1), the 
pension liability to current pensioners totals € 24.3 billion, or 82.6 percent of the official 
€  29.44 billion Hessian government debt reported in 2004. For active workers, we 
calculate the projected benefit obligation (PBO) defined as (Milevsky 2006, p. 173): 
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where (for each civil servant i of Agei) τi is the current number of service years in 2004, 
S67,i is the (expected) salary at retirement age 67,  i a , 67 is the immediate pension annuity 
factor, and r is the discount rate. While there is an ongoing debate about whether the 
PBO in general is an adequate measure for DB pension liabilities (c.f. Bodie, 1990; 
Mittelstaedt and Regier 1993; Gold, 2004), we argue that employing the PBO is 
appropriate for German civil servants’ pension liabilities. In addition to the inflation-
related pay rises discussed above and promotions to higher-paid positions, which we do 
not include in this study, civil servants’ salaries increase deterministically with age. As 
there is no turnover in the workforce, using the accumulated pension obligation (ABO) 
and therefore neglecting these pay increases would understate the already-accrued 
liabilities. 
With the same economic assumptions, pension liabilities for current workers 
amount to € 19.63 billion, or 66.7 percent of the official debt (Rows 2 and 4, Column 
3). Here we see that  the implied pension debt for retired and currently active civil 
servants to date – representing already-accrued benefits – sums to € 43.9 billion, a sum - 12 - 
 
that is almost 150 percent of explicit state debt (summing the values in Rows 2 and 4, 
Columns 1 and 3). Not surprisingly, if the discount rate were cut to 1.5 percent holding 
real wages and benefits constant, accrued pension obligations would grow by €  13 
billion, or by almost 30 percent.  
As civil servant turnover is virtually negligible, it is safe to assume that virtually 
all workers retire from the system in the future. For this reason, Columns 5-6 of Table 2 
show what new liabilities would result if the current system were kept in place for 
active civil servants; in other words, this represents future pension accumulations due to 
the replacement rate increasing over time. With no salary increases and an interest rate 
of 3 percent, these future pension accruals can be valued at € 12.1 billon or 41 percent 
of debt outstanding (Rows 2 and 4, Column 5). For active workers, then, the pension 
promise (both past and future) amounts to about € 31.8 billion, or about 108 percent of 
current explicit debt (summing Columns 3 and 5 in Rows 2 and 4 respectively); to this, 
the state’s total obligation to retirees must be added coming to a total of 190 percent of 
explicit debt (summing Columns 1, 3, and 5, Row 4). In other words, the total 
obligation for both active and retired civil servants amounts to almost twice the current 
explicit state government debt. 
This is of course a lower-bound estimate, as nonzero real salary increases are 
anticipated by most civil servants. If salaries were to rise in real terms by a single 
percentage point per year, this would elevate the expected present value of public 
pension commitments to a staggering € 69.5 billion, or 236 percent of explicit debt 
(summing Columns 2, 4, and 6, Rows 2 and 4 respectively). On the assumption that 
already-retired individuals’ pensions might be financed separately, in what follows 
below we focus only on active workers, scheduled benefit formulas maintained into the 
future would cost € 42.6 billion, or 145 percent of explicit debt if workers receive one 
percent real annual salary growth. (Using a 1.5 percent discount rate boosts unfunded 
liabilities for current workers to € 67.8 billion, and the unfunded unrecognized debt to 
230 percent of recognized state debt.) 
3.5 Funding Future Civil Servants’ Pension Benefits 
Moving to fund the public DB pension plan requires that assets be built up and 
invested in the pension fund. Accordingly, a key responsibility of the plan sponsor is to 
figure out pension liability patterns, and then to specify how much must be contributed 
to pay for those liabilities. In other words, one must assign in a systematic and 
consistent manner the expected cost of pension accruals as each year of service passes 
which gives rise to that cost. One way to make this assignment or cost allocation is 
termed the actuarial cost method, which assigns to each fiscal or plan year the actuarial 
present value of the costs assumed to have accrued in that year, or the so-called “normal 
cost,” on the view that actuarial assumptions are realized. Since civil servant pension - 13 - 
 
benefits in Hesse are determined as a percentage of final salary times years of service, 
we use the aggregate level percentage of payroll method to determine the normal cost. 
This means that the total projected cost allocated to the plan is expressed as a 
percentage of active members’ payroll (McGill et al., 2005). Accordingly, we calculate 
the actuarial present value of future pension accruals based on future salary and service 
over the next 50 years (2004-53), starting with our initial population, and evolve it 
through time given the dynamics presented above. As of 2053, we conduct a 
discontinuance valuation, though of course this calculation could be extended further 
into the future quite naturally. The ratio of present value of pension liabilities to the 
present value of salary payments may be interpreted as the deterministic yearly 
contribution rate as a percentage of active civil servants’ covered payroll needed to fund 
pension promises.
14 
In what follows, we assume that these contributions are paid by the state (i.e. the 
employer) at the beginning of each year and the returns on invested asset are determined 
by a fixed (i.e. non-stochastic) interest rate. In this case, contributions, in conjunction 
with the return on invested assets, would have to be sufficient to finance promised 
pension payments. Results are summarized in Table 3 for the 3 percent discount rate 
and zero salary/benefit growth rate, along with the two alternatives we focused on above 
(namely, a 1.5 percent discount rate and 1 percent real salary/pension growth). The first 
four columns of Table 3 show the present value of current workers’ projected pension 
liabilities and salaries for various rates of annual increase, while Columns 5 and 6 report 
the ratio of the present value of pension costs to salaries on a contribution basis.  
Table 3: Projected Benefit Obligations (PBO) and Contribution Rates: Deterministic 
Model 
     PV Pension 
Liabilities (in € bn)    PV Salaries 
(in € bn)    PV Pensions/PV 
Salaries (in %) 
     Salary-/Pension 
Increase p.a.    Salary-/Pension 
Increase p.a.    Salary-/Pension 
Increase p.a. 
     0%  1%  0%  1%  0%  1% 
 Disc.  Rate   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                
(1)  1.5%   44.8  79.8   149.3  186.6   30.0  42.8 
(2)  3%   20.8  34.6   111.5  135.3   18.7  25.6 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse for 2004. 
Focusing as a benchmark on the results with the 3 percent discount rate and no 
real salary or pension increases, the present value of future pension liabilities incurred 
until 2053 amounts to € 20.8 billion (Row 2, Column 1), while salary payments over the 
same horizon have a present value of € 111.5 billion (Row 2, Column 3). Accordingly, 
the ratio of present values and therefore the average required contribution rate is 18.7 
percent of payroll each year into the future (Row 2, Column 5). If real salaries and 
                                                 
14 To be clear, here we set aside the pension obligation already accrued by retirees, on the presumption 
that these will have to be handled with some other financing mechanism. - 14 - 
 
pensions instead were to rise by 1 percent per year, the implied contribution rate would 
be closer to 26 percent of payroll every year. Not surprisingly, the results are also 
sensitive to the discount rate, since when a lower discount rate is applied, this increases 
both the present value of pension liabilities and salary payments. But since pension 
liabilities are of longer duration than salary payments, contribution rates rise when 
discount rates fall. If the discount rate were 1.5 percent, for instance, contribution rates 
vary between 30 and 42.8 percent, while they range between 18.7 and 25.6 percent for 
the 3 percent interest rate. Inasmuch as the contribution rate of 18.7 percent of payroll 
per year amount corresponds rather well to the contribution rates adopted to enhance the 
funding in Rhineland-Palatinate’s new civil servant plan, we shall use this contribution 
target below in our further analysis. 
4. Stochastic Investment Returns and Pension Plan Funding 
A major concern of plan sponsors running a DB plan is the inherent uncertainty 
of the capital market returns earned on assets backing the pension liabilities. On the one 
hand, good investment performance can help the plan sponsor meet his benefit promises 
and reduce required contribution. On the other hand, if assets fall short of plan 
liabilities, supplementary contributions by the plan sponsor might be required to fill the 
gap. The gap itself, of course, may be used as a funding target for plan liabilities 
specified in a solvency plan. Also crucial is the plan’s asset allocation policy, namely 
how it weights the portfolio in terms of equity and bonds, as this influences the DB 
pension system’s risk and return profile. In what follows, we evaluate the asset-liability 
and decision-making process from the viewpoint of the plan sponsor, to determine a 
sensible plan asset allocation. 
4.1 The Pension Manager’s Objectives and Asset/Liability Modeling  
Let us assume that the objective of moving to a funded DB pension scheme is to 
minimize the worst-case total cost of running the plan over a future long-term time 
horizon.
15 In our case, the actuarial projection of plan liabilities uses a year-by-year 
PBO valuation over a 50 year horizon with mortality rates and populations dynamics 
described in the previous section. In this framework, at the beginning of every period t, 
the sponsor endows the pension plan with funds in form of regular contributions RCt, 
determined by a fixed contribution rate CR related to the salary payments of active civil 
servants in t. Pension payments due at time t are made out of the fund, and remaining 
plan assets are invested in the capital markets.  
At the end of every period, the plan’s funding situation is scrutinized. If the 
funding ratio, defined as the ratio of current plan assets to the current projected benefit 
                                                 
15 As described previously, we set aside benefits already promised to today’s retirees as well as those 
accrued by currently active civil servants. - 15 - 
 
obligation, were to drop below 90 percent, then a solvency rule requires supplementary 
contributions SCt must be made to the plan, so as to return to a funding ratio of 100 
percent. If the funding ratio ever exceeds 120 percent, the rate of regular contributions 
(CR) can be reduced by 50 percent. The plan sponsor will benefit from a contribution 
holiday (i.e. RC = 0) when the funding ratio rises above 150 percent. Depending on the 
scenario under investigation, the plan sponsor may be able to withdraw excess funds 
when the funding ratio exceeds 180 percent. After 50 years, the plan is assumed to be 
terminated by a (hypothetical) hard freeze, i.e. at that time all accrued liabilities are 
transferred to a private insurer together with assets to fund them.  
The aim of the investment policy is to generate a sufficiently high return that 
helps reduce overall pension plan costs, while at the same time controlling for capital 
market fluctuations that might result in substantial worst-case risks. In our model, the 
investment universe comprises two broad asset classes: a global equity index fund, and 
a European government bond index fund. By assuming that the state invests only in 
index funds, we can ensure that the state cannot systematically influence prices. The 
stochastic and dynamics of the evolution portfolio’s value over time are governed by a 
multiplicative random walk with drift. The serially independent and identically normal 
distributed one-period log-returns are given by: 
  t P P t P Z R σ μ + = , , (5) 
where  ( ) 1 , 0 ~ N Zt . Under the assumption of a static asset allocation over time, the 
portfolio is continuously rebalanced to maintain the original investment weights. In this 
case, the expected portfolio log-return μP and the portfolio return standard deviation σP 
can be derived as (Feldstein et al. 2001): 
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where x represents the weight of equities in the portfolio, μE (μB) is the expected log-
return, σE (σB) the return standard deviation of equities (bonds) and ρEB the coefficient 
of correlation between both asset classes. 
The asset model parameters we employ for the simulation are given in Table 4. 
For equities, these are estimated from the MSCI World Equities total return index (1974 
– 2003). For bonds, our estimates are based on the JP Morgan European Government 
Bonds total return index (1988 – 2003), which we augment with the REXP German 
Government Bonds total return index for the period 1974 – 1987 due to unavailability - 16 - 
 
of the former. All index data are provided by DataStream. To incorporate estimation 
risk in the critical estimation of expected asset returns, we increase the estimated return 
standard deviations by the standard errors of the mean return estimations (Barry 1974; 
Klein and Bawa 1976; this corresponds to the two-step estimation procedure used in 
Feldstein et al., 2001). Financial integration in Europe, the creation of the European 
Monetary Union, and the accompanying Maastricht convergence criteria, have reduced 
interest rates in the Euro zone, leading to lower expected future returns on European 
government bonds. We therefore reduce the historically estimated return expectation for 
the European bonds by 1 percent. Finally, we subtract the equivalent of 30 basis points 
from the annual portfolio return to reflect administrative expenses. 
 
    Table 4: Simulation Model Parameters for Stochastic Asset Case 
         Correlations 
   Expected 
log return 
Standard 
deviation 
 Global 
equities 
European 
bonds 
           
Global equities    7.1%  20.2%    1   
European bonds    4.5%  6.7%    0.14  1 
   Notes: Authors’ calculations.  
The optimal investment and contribution policy for the partially funded public 
plan is obtained from running a Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 iterations over the 
50-year projection horizon. To identify the optimal investment and contribution policy 
for the pension plan, we assume that the objective of the plan sponsor is to minimize the 
worst-case cost of running the plan.
16 Accordingly, we specify the probability 
distribution of the stochastic present value of total pension cost TPC and identify the 
asset allocation and regular contribution rate fixed at the beginning of the projection 
horizon
17 that minimizes the Conditional Value at Risk at the 5 percent level.  
More formally, total pension costs are calculated as the sum of regular 
contributions RCt and supplementary contributions SCt made by the plan sponsor in 
period t. Depending on the set-up, these plan costs may or may not be reduced by the 
withdrawals Wt of excess funds. All payments into or withdrawals from the plan are 
discounted at the fixed real interest rate r, reflecting the government’s financing cost. 
Thus, the optimization problem is specified by: 
 
                                                 
16 See also Albrecht et al. (2006). 
17 We deliberately do not consider a strategy whereby the investment weights and contribution rates are 
optimized dynamically over time, e.g. by using a dynamic optimization framework. While from a 
theoretical vantage point this might yield better results, here we argue that political decisionmakers may 
be unable to implement this in practice. - 17 - 
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The Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) at the α percent confidence level is 
defined as the expected total pension cost under the condition that its realization is 
greater than the Value at Risk (VaR) for that level, i.e.: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) TPC VaR TCP TPC E TPC CVaR % % | α α > =  (8) 
 
CVaR has significant advantages as a measure of risk over the commonly-used 
VaR measure, defined as  ( ) α α = >VaR TPC P , i.e. the costs that will not be exceeded 
with a given probability of (1- α) percent. First, CVAR not only concentrates on a 
specified percentile of a loss distribution, but it also accounts for the extent of the loss in 
the distributional tails beyond this percentile. Therefore, the Conditional Value at Risk 
is a coherent risk measure with respect to the axioms developed by Artzner et al. (1997, 
1999). Second, from the perspective of numerical portfolios optimization, CVaR is 
better behaved than VaR because of its convexity with respect to decision variables 
(Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002). 
In principle, pension benefits ought to be financed by the regular contributions to 
the plan so that supplementary contributions should be required only as a last resort 
(e.g. in case of a severe capital market downturn). If a plan sponsor must be forced to 
make supplementary contributions often, this indicates that the rate of regular 
contributions is likely to be insufficient. To encourage adequate regular contributions, 
we therefore introduce a penalty for supplementary contributions represented by the 
parameter ξ1. This is structured such that to finance an asset shortfall of one Euro, the 
sum of (1+ ξ1) Euros must be accounted for as a plan cost. At the same time, it seems 
reasonable to restrict the pension plan from being used as a “hedge fund” investment 
account that can become hugely overfunded (which might happen if the sponsor were to 
short government bonds to create excess revenues by cashing in on the equity 
premium). For this reason, we levy a withdrawal penalty on the state pension plan of ξ2, 
so withdrawing one Euro from the plan means only (1- ξ2) Euros are credited. The term 
ξ can also be interpreted as the cost of additional financing, and it therefore counters a 
common perception that public funds paid into the civil servant pension plan are “free” 
money. 
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4.2 Optimal Pension Fund Asset Allocation with a Fixed Contribution Rate 
Next we draw on our results above to derive the optimal asset allocation for plan 
assets when the contribution rate is fixed at a given ratio of projected benefit obligation 
to the present value of projected future salaries. Table 5 summarizes the results for the 
same real discount rate of 3 percent, no real salary or pension increases, and a 20 
percent penalty factor for supplementary contributions ξ1 and withdrawals ξ2. The fixed 
contribution rate is set at 18.7% since in Table 3 this resulted in a deterministic PBO of 
€ 20.82 billion; this is a useful benchmark against we can measure the risk/return profile 
of various investment strategies. 
Key findings are provided for three asset allocation policies, namely a 100 
percent bond portfolio, a 100 percent equity portfolio, and the endogenously determined 
optimal portfolio which minimizes the CVaR. Results reported in Panel 1 of Table 5 
display the related portfolio weights in equity and bond investments assuming a static 
asset allocation (Rows 1 and 2), the expected present value of total pension costs (Row 
3), and the 5% Conditional Value at Risk (Row 4). Panel 2 contains, for the same 
investment policies, the expectation and the 5% Conditional Value at Risk of discounted 
supplementary contributions (Rows 5 and 6), as well as the discounted final-period 
withdrawals credited to the objective function (Rows 7 and 8). Additionally, two ways 
to dispose of pension surplus are modeled. Columns 1-3 permit the pension manager to 
withdraw plan assets exceeding 180 percent of the PBO (reduced by the penalty factor); 
these would be credited to the objective function as reducing pension costs. By contrast, 
in Columns 4-6, the excess assets are not credited, i.e. ξ2 = 100%, which reduces the 
plan manager’s incentive to over-endow the pension fund by leaning on the excess of 
the equity premium over the assumed discount rate. 
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Table 5: Risk of Alternative Asset Allocation Patterns for Active Workers, Assuming Fixed 
Contribution Rate 
  Fixed contribution rate: 18.7%    Withdrawals credited    Withdrawals NOT credited 
  Deterministic PBO: € 20.82 bn     
  Real Discount Rate: 3%   
100% 
Bonds 
100% 
Equities 
Cost min.
Asset Mix   
100% 
Bonds 
100% 
Equities 
Cost min. 
Asset Mix 
     (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Panel  1              
(1) Equity  weight    0%  100%  30%    0%  100%  24% 
(2) Bond  weight    100%  0%  70%    100%  0%  76% 
(3)  Expected pension costs (€ bn)    11.74  -12.90  3.03    17.60  15.04  14.96 
(4)  5%-CVaR pension costs (€ bn)    23.92  28.74  19.70    25.50  35.56  22.70 
                  
 Panel  2              
(5)  Exp. Suppl. Contributions (€ bn)    1.18  6.61  0.79    1.18  6.61  0.70 
(6)  5%-CVaR Suppl. Contrib. (€ bn)    5.95  21.97  4.94    5.95  21.97  4.50 
(7)  Exp. Withdrawals (€ bn)    5.93  32.30  11.80    0.00  0.00  0.00 
(8)  5%-CVaR Withdrawals (€ bn)    0.18  4.35  1.28    0.00  0.00  0.00 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse. Contribution rate in % of salaries, 
real salary-/pension increase 0%. Supplementary contributions required in case of funding ratio (i.e. fund 
assets/PBO) below 90% to restore funding ratio of 100%. Contribution rate reduced by 50% (100%) in 
case of funding ratio above 120% (150%). Withdrawal of funds in excess of 180% of liabilities. 
Opportunity costs of supplementary contributions addressed by accounting for an agio of ξ1 = 20%. 
Withdrawals credited to objective function in case Withdrawals credited (ξ2 = 20%), lost in case 
Withdrawals NOT credited (ξ2 = 100%). 
 
Before evaluating the optimal asset investment policy, we assess two polar 
cases, namely a 100 percent bond investment case, and a 100 percent equity case. When 
the fund is fully invested in bonds, total expected pension costs for active employees 
come to € 11.74 billion (Row 3, Column 1) and the CVaR is valued at € 23.92 billion or 
about € 2.1 billion higher than the deterministic PBO benchmark (Row 4, Column 1). 
On top of regular pension contributions, taxpayers must anticipate making another 
€ 1.18 billion in supplementary contributions, with a 5% CVaR of this amount about 
five times that, at € 5.95 billion (Rows 5 and 6, Column 1). When expected withdrawals 
can be credited, albeit with a penalty, the managers can anticipate a value of almost € 6 
billion, while virtually no funds will be withdrawn in the worst case (Rows 7 and 8, 
Column 1).   
By comparison, if the plan were to invest fully in equity (which we recognize is 
highly unlikely in the case of a public pension), there is enormous upside as well as 
downside potential. For instance, the expected value of withdrawals comes to an 
impressive € 32.3 billion (Row 7, Column 2), resulting in a negative expected total 
pension costs of - €  12.9 billion (Row 3, Column 2). What this means is that “on 
average”, after a start-up phase, the plan manager could expect to have contribution 
holidays if he invested the entire fund in equities, and withdrawals would be sufficient 
to recover more monies than were paid into the plan. However, this impressive upside 
potential comes at the price of substantially enhanced capital market risk that could 
easily drive the funding situation to unacceptable levels. The CVaR of supplementary 
contributions comes to € 21.97 billion (Column 2, Row 6) leading to a CVaR of total 
pension costs of € 28.74 billion (Column 2, Row 4), which substantially exceeds the 
expected costs calculated under the deterministic PBO benchmark. - 20 - 
 
In Column 3 we depict the optimal investment strategy given the contribution 
rate, which in Rows 1 and 2 consists of 30 percent equities and 70 percent bonds. This 
lowers expected pension costs for active employees to only €  3.03 billion (Row 3, 
Column 3), much lower than the € 20.82 billion benchmark of required funding in the 
deterministic case. This low level of costs can be attributed to the considerable expected 
benefit of investing in the capital market. The fund is paid 18.7 percent of payroll from 
the outset for each active employee, but actual pension cash flows are initially small. 
Accordingly, a pension fund invested 30 percent in equities and 70 percent in bonds 
yields an expected gross return of 6.24 percent per year, which is double the 3 percent 
threshold for which the benchmark contribution rate of 18.7 percent was derived. With a 
return volatility of 8.17 percent, the pension fund faces rather moderate capital market 
risk, and as a result, the plan would be expected to accumulate considerable assets rather 
quickly. The possibility of contribution holidays as well as withdrawals steadily 
increases through time, while the risk of supplementary contributions required by the 
solvency rule diminishes. Compared to the deterministic case with a present value of 
payments or PBO of € 20.82 billion, this funding and investment policy mix reduces 
expected costs substantially. The worst case exposure is also well-controlled. For 
instance, the 5% Conditional Value at Risk of total pension costs (i.e. average costs in 
the 5 percent worst cases) only comes to € 19.7 billion (Row 4, Column 3) well below 
the benchmark. Expected supplementary contributions are also rather low, with a 
present value of €  790 million (Row 5, Column 3) and in the worst case – again 
represented by the 5 percent Conditional Value at Risk – they amount to € 4.94 billion, 
roughly 25 percent of the deterministic PBO (Row 6, Column 3). Giving managers 
credit for withdrawals can offer major cost-cutting potential for the plan. In the worst-
case scenario, plan withdrawals would be only € 1.28 billion, but in expectation they 
amount to € 11.8 billion (Rows 7 and 8, Column 3). 
If excess withdrawals are not credited to the account, managerial incentives to 
overendow the plan are greatly reduced. Here, the only incentive for risking 
supplementary contributions caused by underfunding is the opportunity to enjoy 
reduced contribution rates or even contribution holidays if the funding ratio should 
exceed 180 percent. Columns 4-6 of Table 5 show that expected pension costs and the 
CVaR amounts now exceed comparable values in Columns 1-2 when either extreme 
investment strategy is selected, while the supplementary contributions are the same, By 
contrast, the optimal investment strategy now requires that only 24 percent of the funds 
must be held in equities (Row 1, Column 6), which is 6 percentage points less than 
when withdrawals are credited. Clearly, having a capped upside potential makes return-
driven investment less attractive. At the same time, not rewarding risk taking curtails 
worries about having to make supplementary contributions. The impact on total plan 
costs given the optimal investment strategy can again be seen in Panel 1. If withdrawals 
are not credited, the worst-case costs rise to an overall € 22.7 billion (Row 4, Column 6) - 21 - 
 
with expected plan costs of € 14.96 billion (Row 3, Column 6). This is an increase of 
almost € 12 billion compared to the case where withdrawals are permitted, roughly the 
value of expected withdrawals if they are allowed. 
In sum, allowing the public pension plan to partially prefund benefits and engage 
in an optimal investment policy could be expected to mitigate the economic cost of 
providing the pension promise, while at the same time minimizing the consequences of 
capital market volatility. 
4.3 Simultaneously Optimizing Contribution Rates and Pension Fund Asset 
Allocation 
In the case of public pension plans, it is often thought that current policymakers 
might prefer relatively low contribution rates to hold the line on current fiscal 
expenditures. On the other hand, if regular contributions are too low, this could require 
high future supplementary contributions if the plan becomes underfunded. Accordingly, 
a balance must be found across these interests. Therefore we next analyze how changes 
in the contribution rates might affect key pension outcomes, in addition to asset 
allocation. 
Given a contribution rate of 18.7 percent, we showed above that the optimal 
asset allocation is 30 percent in equities and 70 percent in bonds when pension asset 
withdrawals are credited to the plan manager’s objective function. We also show that 
the worst-case total pension costs measured by the 5%  CVaR are €  19.7 billion, 
compared to the deterministic PBO of € 20.82 billion (at the benchmark discount rate of 
3 percent). Yet there is some room for the pension plan manager to tap the full risk 
budget, if he can change both the asset allocation and the regular contribution rate. 
Accordingly, in what follows, we seek the optimal combination of a fixed contribution 
rate and asset allocation which fully bails out the given risk budget specified by the 
deterministic PBO. 
To obtain this solution, we vary the equity weights and the contribution rate 
(between 0 and 18.7 percent) to identify the equity/contribution pair that provides an 
overall worst-case pension cost equal to the PBO. From a formal perspective, we use 
the same objective function as equation (7) but we optimize over the investment weight 
in equities x as well as the rate of regular contributions CR: 
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Results are depicted in Figure 3, assuming a 3 percent discount rate and 
permitting final-period excess funds to be credited. Here we observe the structural 
interrelation between the rate of regular contributions (CR) and the optimal equity 
exposure for a given risk budget measured by the 5% Conditional Value at Risk of total 
pension costs. Specifically, we present the “Iso-CVaR” curve for a value of € 20.82 
billion in the space spanned by the fraction in equity and the regular contribution rate. 
This curve is U-shaped. This means the pension plan manager can reduce regular 
payments up to a minimum level of about 12.7 percent when simultaneously choosing 
an equity exposure of about 32 percent (Point B in Figure 3). If a higher regular 
contribution rate were preferred, the equity exposure can either be reduced or increased. 
For example, a contribution rate of 18.7 percent is consistent with the predetermined 
PBO risk budget for either an equity weight of about 14 percent (Point A) or 50 percent 
(Point D). This can be explained as follows: a portfolio heavier in equity is expected to 
generate relatively higher returns, which offers the opportunity of future contributions 
holidays and possible withdrawals. Yet the relatively high volatility of asset returns 
might also cause pension asset shortfalls, leading to a relatively high risk of 
supplementary contributions that naturally offsets the possibility of contribution 
holidays and withdrawals. By contrast, a more bond-oriented investment policy 
provides more stable expected investment returns over time, and therefore a relatively 
low risk of supplementary contributions. On the other hand, future taxpayers will have 
little chance to cut plan financing costs. 
For more insight into these interrelations, we analyze four specific combinations 
of contribution rates and equity weights depicted in Figure 3, namely the minimum 
return volatility combination (Point A), the minimum regular contribution combination 
(Point B), the maximum return combination (Point D), and an intermediate setting 
(Point C). Table 6 summarizes the results. Consistent with our objective function (8), all 
strategies have similar worst-case pension costs of €  20.8 billion equal to the 
deterministic PBO benchmark (Row 5). On the other hand, the different funding and 
investment policies generate substantial differences with regard to the risk of 
supplementary contributions and the opportunities for possible withdrawals. Starting 
with an 18.7 contribution, and a 14 percent equity weight (the minimum return volatility 
case in Column 1), the risk of supplementary contributions is low due to sufficient 
regular funding and stable investment returns over time. Supplementary contributions 
amount to only € 710 million in expectation, and € 4.37 billion in the worst case (Rows 
6 and 7, Column 1). This, however, comes at the price of meager possible withdrawals 
(Rows 8 and 9) and a lower chance of contribution holidays. 
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Figure 3: Iso-CVaR Curve of Total Pension Costs 
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Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse. 
Next we examine what would happen if the hope was to make only a minimum 
regular contribution – an option that might be favored by politicians with a relatively 
near-term time horizon. Column 2 sets the contribution rate at only 12.7 percent and 
then invests 32 percent of the fund assets in equities (Rows 1 and 2); the results show 
that this approach leads to considerably higher risks for future generations, compared to 
the better funded case. For instance, the worst-case supplementary contributions 
required to offset possible underfunding amount to € 10.27 billion (Row 7), which is 
more than 2 times the sum of the minimum volatility case (Column 1). Worst-case 
supplementary contributions are about 25 percent higher, compared to the maximum 
return case (Column 4), while at the same time expected withdrawals only amount to 
about 60 percent (Row 8). 
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Table 6: Asset Allocation and Regular Contributions for Given Risk Budget 
  Deterministic PBO: € 20.82 bn   
  Real Discount Rate: 3%   
Min. Return 
Volatility 
Minimum 
Reg. Contr. 
Intermedi
ate 
Maximum 
Return 
     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Panel  1          
(1) Contribution  Rate    18.7%  12.7%  15%  18.7% 
(2) Equity  weight    14%  32%  43%  50% 
(3) Bond  weight    86%  68%  57%  50% 
(4)  Expected pension costs (€ bn)    7.63  3.98  0.46  -2.23 
(5)  5%-CVaR pension costs (€ bn)    20.8  20.8  20.8  20.8 
            
 Panel  2          
(6)  Exp. Suppl. Contributions (€ bn)    0.71  3.67  2.77  1.45 
(7)  5%-CVaR Suppl. Contrib. (€ bn)    4.37  10.27  9.70  7.83 
(8)  Exp. Withdrawals (€ bn)    8.31  10.54  13.91  16.88 
(9)  5%-CVaR Withdrawals (€ bn)    0.84  0.51  0.92  1.62 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data provided by the State of Hesse. Contribution 
rate in % of salaries, real salary-/pension increase 0%. Supplementary contributions 
required in case of funding ratio (i.e. fund assets/PBO) below 90% to restore funding 
ratio of 100%. Contribution rate reduced by 50% (100%) in case of funding ratio 
above 120% (150%). Withdrawal of funds in excess of 180% of liabilities. 
Opportunity costs of supplementary contributions addressed by accounting for an agio 
of ξ1 = 20%. Withdrawals credited to objective function (ξ2 = 20%). 
 
Alternatively, we examine the results from maintaining a regular contribution 
rate of 18.7 percent but increasing the equity exposure to 50 percent (Column 4). 
Naturally this results in a quite different risk-/return profile for future generations. Here, 
the worst-case supplementary contributions almost double the benchmark, rising from 
€ 4.37 to € 7.83 billion (Row 7, Columns 1 versus 4). Of course this tactic does offer 
future taxpayers a respectable chance of participating in the capital markets and 
profiting from contribution holidays. As can be seen from Row 8, the expected present 
value of withdrawals under this high equity scenario comes to € 16.88 billion (Column 
4), which is more than twice the amount in the minimum return volatility case. 
Column 3 shows an intermediate case, which seeks to balance the interest of 
both groups. Here current taxpayers only have to pay regular contributions of 15 
percent, and the portfolio is held 43 percent in equities. This allows future generations 
to benefit from possible contribution holidays and withdrawals, while providing an 
acceptable level of risk of supplementary contributions resulting from underfunding. 
4.4 Further Results 
To verify the robustness of our results, we have repeated the analyses for a 
variety of other parameter settings. Reducing the discount rate from 3 to 1.5 percent and 
cutting expected asset returns by the same 1.5 percent results in a deterministic PBO of 
€ 44.8 billion and a corresponding contribution rate of 30 percent (Table 3, Row 1, 
Columns 1 and 5). Based on these and crediting fund withdrawals, the optimal equity 
weight comes to 26 percent with expected total pension costs of € 18.47 billion. Worst-
case pension costs exceed the deterministic PBO by only € 1.7 billion or 4 percent. - 25 - 
 
Increasing the penalty factors for supplementary contributions and withdrawals 
to ξ1 = ξ2 = 0.5 also leads to an optimal equity weight of 26 percent. Expected and 
worst-case pension costs increase from €  3.03 billion and €  19.7 billion (Table 5, 
Column 3, Rows 3 and 4) to € 8.42 billion and € 21.44 billion respectively. 
Allowing for contribution holidays already to be taken when the funding ratio 
exceeds 120 percent and postponing the withdrawal of excess funds until the final 
period results in expected pension costs of € 2.49 billion and € 19.6 billion in the worst 
case. This requires 29 percent of plan funds being held in equities and 71 percent in 
bonds. 
5. Conclusions 
As in many other nations, German civil servants are covered by unfunded 
defined benefit pensions. This substantial underfunding represents a substantial liability 
that is not, to date, recognized as explicit taxpayer obligations. For the German state of 
Hesse, we have conservatively estimated this liability for current pensioners of € 24 
billion in present value, and amounts already accrued by current workers adds another 
€ 20 billion (with a discount rate of 3 percent and zero real salary/pension increases). 
The total of € 44 billion is massive, amounting to almost 150 percent of explicit state 
debt. When we then also account for future pension accruals for active workers under 
current formulas, new obligations can be valued at €  12 billon or an additional 41 
percent of outstanding debt. In other words, the total obligation of € 56 billion for both 
active and retired civil servants amounts to almost twice the current explicit state 
government debt. A one percent rise in salaries and benefits elevates the expected 
present value of public pension commitments to a staggering €  70 billion, or 236 
percent of explicit debt. 
Next we analyze ways to move to a better funded pension plan for Hesse’s civil 
servants, narrowing the focus to active employees (on the assumption that already-
retired workers’ benefits would have to be paid from other sources). We show that 
annual contribution rates of around 19 percent of payroll would be consistent with a 
traditional actuarial valuation (assuming a discount rate of 3 percent). Given this, we 
study alternative investment policies using a stochastic asset/liability framework that 
minimizes the expected economic costs of providing the promised pensions, while at the 
same time controlling possibly adverse capital market outcomes. We illustrate that the 
optimal pension fund investment strategy given this contribution rate consists of 30 
percent equities and 70 percent in bonds. It is interesting that this is virtually identical to 
the 31/69 stock/bond allocation for US public sector pension plans in 2007 (Wilshire 
Consulting, 2007). Compared to the deterministic case, this funding and investment 
policy mix reduces expected costs substantially, and the worst-case exposure is also 
well-controlled. Finally, we show that the pension plan manager can better tap the risk - 26 - 
 
budget if he is allowed to alter both his asset allocation and the plan’s regular 
contribution rate. In one interesting case, current taxpayers are asked to pay regular 
contributions of only 15 percent, and the portfolio is held 43 percent in equities. This 
allows future generations to benefit from possible contribution holidays and 
withdrawals, while providing an acceptable level of risk of supplementary contributions 
resulting from underfunding. 
Our research should be of broad interest to employees as well as taxpayers, 
insofar as many civil servant pensions in Europe are underfunded or even totally 
unfunded. For the German case, it would be useful to assess all state and Federal 
government public sector pension liabilities following methodology such as that 
presented here. Furthermore, we have shown that under plausible assumptions, as the 
shortfalls are gradually funded, the assets could be sensibly invested to reduce expected 
burdens on future workers and retirees. In ongoing work, we are evaluating additional 
aspects of the optimal investment scenario.  - 27 - 
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